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THE general property tax, upon which our state and local gov-
ernments still rely most heavily to fill their treasuries, has long
been a focus of criticism. One of our ablest commentators, hav-
ing with admirable comprehensiveness summed up the experi-
ence of both European and domestic tax authorities, has said
that as a result of "inherent defects" "the general property
tax in the United St&tes is a dismal failure ;" "the whole system
is unsound;" ' "practically, the... tax as actually administered
is .. . one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world." 2
These are general judgments that express attitudes resulting
from innumerable particular instances and experiences. The
critically minded usually ask for a bill of particulars. To one
who would contrive such a bill, a number of paths are open;
but few offer the convenience and accessibility and wealth of
the law digests. Necessity and interest alike dictate a limitation
of the bill to only a portion of that "wilderness of single in-
stance," and the chosen portion has to do with public utilities
and the valuation process that usually, though not invariably,
is part of the property tax machinery.
So long as states require tax contributions to be measured by
the value of citizens' property, problems of valuation seem des-
tined to abide. When property is simple and bears no functional
relationship to other property, the assessors' estimates of value
are considered sufficient. But obviously, where the property is
tremendously complex, as with public utilities, and the considera-
tions involved are legion, simple judgments will not do. More
complicated methods must be resorted to. Out of this necessity
grow the many problems of valuation that seem to be inevitable
adjuncts of the ad valJorent system. The following pages are
* A.B. University of Minnesota, 1928, LL.B., 1930; J.S.D. Yale, 1931;
member of Minnesota Bar; Research Assistant at Yale Law School.
1 SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION, (9th ed. 1921) 31.
2 SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 62.
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devoted to a review of some of them, and to the proposal of a
possible solution.
In the domain of corporation and public utility taxation, the
great bother began with the dawn of the perception that the
articulation of properties into operating units gave rise to in-
tangible values. These values had theretofore escaped taxation
under methods designed only for comparatively simple and
isolated physical properties. Steps calculated to capture these
values were seasonably taken. The unitary grouping and func-
tioning of physical properties that brought forth intangible
values demanded that they be assessed as units. Out .of this
necessity was born the unit rule, by which the properties of
corporations extending over several taxing jurisdictions may
be assessed. as a unit in order to reach "the value resulting from
the combination of the means" by which business is carried on.
That physical properties when combined into a functioning or-
ganic whole in the form, for example, of a going public utility
possess a value far beyond the sum of the values of the individual
parts is, of course, fundamental; 3 and the unit rule, achieved
not without some struggle,4 is and has long been a basic dogma
of taxation.
The gains from reaching intangible values were not to be had
without further cost, however; for unitary assessment carries
its peculiar retinue of problems. There is the great question
of what constitutes a unit. What kind of relationship of prop-
erties shall be said to render them a unit? What kind of prop-
erties should be included? There are many kinds of property,
and subtle shadings of relationship. Secondly, how shall these
properties be valued, sprawling as they often do wide over
countryside, far beyond the taxing jurisdiction, and including,
3 Courts sustain assessments attacked because they include some or all
intangible values, State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 111 Minn. 21, 124 N.
W. 380 (1910); In re Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 67 Okla. 301, 171
Pac. 26 (1918) ; State v. Pullman Co., 178 Wis. 240, 189 N. W. 543 (1922) ;
hold assessments that omit intangible values to be erroneous, Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sullivan, 173 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); In ro
Assessment of Western Union Tel. Co., 35 Okla. 626, 130 Pac. 565 (1912);
and grant the remedy of mandamus to compel assessors to include such
values, State v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N. W. 716 (1902); State v.
State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413, 186 Pac. 697 (1919).
4 A hasty perusal reveals how hotly contested was the case of Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305 (1897),
opinion on reargument, 166 U. S. 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 604 (1897), decided
many years after the unit rule had become a fixed element of tax ad-
ministration and had been approved by the Supreme Court itself in the
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875). That it should ever have
been decided that a railroad should be valued as so many rails, so many
ties, etc., as in Huntington v. Central Pac. R. R., Fed. Cas. No. 6,911, (C.
C. D. Cal. 1874) today seems quite absurd.
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as they sometimes do, securities tucked away in vaults at the
opposite end of the country. Thirdly, since it is elementary that
a state cannot tax property outside its jurisdiction, how is the
value of the unit, once discovered, to be apportioned so that
the taxing jurisdiction reaches only values that can be said to
be within it? This has often proved to be not at all easy in
measuring and allocating something so imponderable and elusive
as intangible values. Lastly, equality being a prime desideratum
in taxation, assessments must be equalized,-that is to say, listed
at the same proportion of their ascertained value as other prop-
erty in the same tax class in the taxing jurisdiction. The first
and third of these have been fully treated elsewhere in a de-
tailed consideration of the unit rule. The last, except as it
raises peculiarly local problems, ordinarily becomes an issue only
when assessing authbrities neglect to do it. It is the second that
is of concern here.
I
What is this "value" that is the object of assessors' search under
the ad valorem system? Is it something single, definite and
identifiable? Or is it another phantom, which, like others not
unknown in the law, stalks through our reports never to be
captured? The initiated in economic doctrine are familiar with
the mazes of theory that have grown up about the term. Valua-
tions for rate-making are notorious among lawyers and laymen
alike.
It seems that there are values and values, even for the same
property, varying, at least in quantitative expression, according
to the purpose for which we seek to measure value.0 It has been
pointed out that in law there are at least a dozen purposes for
which that concept is invoked," and there are doubtless more.
Does "value" have a different meaning for each purpose? That
thought has been greeted by many judges only with impatience
and contempt.
The state legislatures, which have commanded assessors and
courts to find value, have also essayed a measure of definition.
The commands, varying in phraseology, are to find "true cash
value," "true value in money," "ful cash value," "fair cash
value." 8 Then, by way of definition of these terms, the various
5 See Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 838.
6See Professor Bonbright's introduction to DODD, STOCK WATEING
(1930), describing an undertaking by a group of the faculty of Columbia
University to show the various meanings of "value" as used for different
purposes.
" Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial Valuation (1927) 27 COL. L. R V.
493.
s See Tunnell, Value for Taxation and Value for Rate Making, NAT. TAx
ASS'N PROCEEDINGS (1927) 263, 264.
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statutes declare that value means ". . . the value at which the
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a
solvent debtor ;" 9 "the price it would bring at a fair voluntary
sale ;" 10 and "its value in the market in the ordinary course of
trade." " These are representative definitions. They come, in
short, to market value.
It would have been surprising if legislatures had chosen any
other definition, for traditionally in economics and commerce
value had long since come to signify "power in exchange" or
exchange value; and there was and still is more nearly a con-
sensus in this than in any other use of the term value. In this
consensus lies a danger, for it has led many to believe, first,
that there is no other proper meaning, and secondly that there
is a market value. In fact, some have been led into even greater
error, for evidence is not wanting that some judges think of
value as inherent in things, regarding them metaphysically as
a definite attribute of them, like their color. One court, in de-
fining what the local statute meant by the phrase "cash value"
said: "This means what has a recognizable pecuniary value in-
herent in itself and not enhanced or diminished according to the
person who owns or uses it." 12 Similar notions of value in the
minds of other judges may be inferred from the manner and
frequency with which they use the terms "actual value" or "true
value"-terms that are liberally scattered through the reports.
Cases reveal little if any uniformity of practice in application
of the market value concept. Judicial analysis has rarely gone
far enough to disclose the possibility of dozens of variations in
markets depending on the time, the place,1 3 the uses to which the
property could be put,14 the bidders, and many other factors. As
one commentator has shown, difference of views as to the
identity of the bidders alone accounts for three variations in the
market value concept.12  Thus, as one court sees the matter, the
present owner may not be considered a bidder, though the prop-
9 IDAHO CoP. STAT. (1919) § 3104.
10 OKLA. CONST., art. 10, § 8; KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 4020, 4078(2);
KY. CONST., § 172; cf. ILL. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 120, §§ 3, 4.
11 NEB. Comxp. STAT. (1929) §§ 77-201.
12 Perry v. City of Big Rapids, 67 Mich. 146, 34 N. W. 530 (1887); of.
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio
State Auditor, supra note 4.
13 A mile or two often makes a vast difference. See Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Board of Revision, 52 Sup. Ct. 48 (U. S. 1931) (distance of coal
lands from a river).
14 See State ex. rel. Oshkosh Country Club v. Petrick, 172 Wis. 82, 178
N. W. 251 (1920) (golf course held assessable as meadow land since it
could be sold only for that purpose). See Rifkind, What is Fair Valu in
Taxation? NAT. TAX Ass'N PROCEEDINGS (1926) 305.
1oRifkind, op. cit. supra note 14.
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erty is worth a great deal more to him than to anyone else.10 A
second court seems to feel that although the present owner may
be considered among the bidders, the conception of the market
must not go "beyond the point where there would have been
competition among probable buyers into the region of value to
the petitioner alone." 17 A third court conceives the buyers to be
'hypothetical buyers, not actual or existing purchasers," (and
the sale, of course, is a hypothetical sale.) 1
Again, the general state of the market may make some differ-
ence. Some courts have laid down the rule that values are to be
fixed for assessment purposes according to values prevailing at
the time the assessments are made,10 thus ruling adversely to
counsel who pleaded that prices prevailing in inflated markets
ought not to govern. A demoralized and frozen market owing
to depression alters matters profoundly. Governmental expendi-
tures do not vary directly with the cycles of depression and
prosperity; and the trend seems always upward. "Was it the
purpose of the statute," asks one court, "to jeopardize the ma-
chinery of state, county, district, and municipality, during a
depression... ?" ".... does the law require the rule to be strictly
applied to any particular year in which property, due to depres-
sion and unhealthy business conditions, has no prospective buyer
at any figure?" The answer, of course, was no; consideration
of market values is not to be confined strictly to those obtaining
in the year of assessment20
76 See State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Weiher,
177 Wis. 445, 188 N. W. 598 (1922).
17 Massachusetts General Hospital v. Belmont, 233 Blass. 190, 209, 124
N. E. 21, 28 (1919).
IsPennsylvania R. R. -. Jersey City, 98 N. J. L. 283, 125 AUt. 921
(1922). In Turnley v. City of Elizabeth, 76 N. J. L. 42, 44, 68 AtL 1094,
1095 (1908), the court said: "The criterion established by statute is a
hypothetical sale; hence the buyers therein referred to are hypothetical
buyers, not actual or exsting purchasers." A very interesting contrast
to these cases is presented by the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853 (1914),
wherein a state anti-trust law was declared unconstitutional because the
criterion of unlawfulness was a standard of conduct impossible to know
in advance and to comply with. The criterion was whether the combina-
tion enhanced prices beyond the "true value" of the commodity, that is,
what the fair market value of the commodities sold by the persons or
firms charged with violation would be under other than existing condi-
tions. The language of the opinion is beautifully pat to the assessment
process.
19 People ex rel. New York Dock Co. v. Cantor, 208 App. Div. 52, 203
N. Y. Supp. 424 (2d Dep't 1924); Mackay Telegraph Co. v. Board of
State Affairs, 149 La. 398, 89 So. 249 (1921).
20 Central Realty Co. v. Board of Equalization and Review, 158 S. E.
537, 538 (W. Va. 1931). The statute was "1... enacted to cover ordinary
conditions existing over a period of years."
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Compared witl the number of kinds of goods offered for sale,
there are relatively few highly organized markets, like our
security and commodity markets, in which rather definite
(though fluctuating) market values are to be found. Certainly
there is no such market for public utilities. In whatever degree
the ordinary run of goods, articles, and objects may be said
to have markets and market values they differ from public
utilities. To talk of market values in connection with such cor-
porations is either to thrust the market value concept into a
domain where it is quite irrelevant and does not belong or to
endow it with an entirely new and peculiar sense.
2
1
Since absence of market value is not synonymous with non-
saleability, assessors and courts, having been directed to find
market value where there is none, have to some extent taken
what seemed to be the next best course, that of putting them-
selves in the position of a prospective purchaser, or, more real-
istically stated, that of taking into account the multifarious
factors that might be supposed to influence a prospective buyer
of the particular property. But this is an attempt at a sort of
clairvoyance, since the sale and buyers -are all "hypothetical,"
and the results, in the nature of things, unverifiable.
It is perhaps possible that Mr. Justice Brewer was right in
asserting that "it is a cardinal rule which should never be for-
gotten that whatever property is worth for the purposes of in-
come and sale it is also worth for purposes of taxation," 22-if
what it is worth for purposes of sale could be found. But why,
after all, should market value be the goal of a tax assessment?
Sale, though perhaps the commonest of purposes for which
property is valued, very probably involves many considerations
quite different from those relevant to a tax assessment. Al-
though three distinct and well known theories of the proper
distribution of the tax burden have been developed and applied,3
the value at which a taxpayer's property could be sold bears but
little relationship to any of them. It may be supposed, as a
matter of historical speculation, that since it had for generations
21 "'Value' (meaning value in exchange) as the classical economists
used the term, becomes almost meaningless in the case of large industrial
plants. The plant cannot be exchanged; it can only acquire new man-
agers; and its onlly 'solid value' (to coin a phrase) is the possibility of
its being useful to commercial society." A. A. Berle, Jr., Book Review,
(1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1225, 1227.
22 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 220, 17 Sup.
Ct. 604, 606 (1897).
23 See Rottschaefer, A State Income Tax and the Minnesota, Constitn-
tion (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 683, at 694, 696. The three are: the benefit
theory, the ability-to-pay theory, and the theory that "taxes should be
so distributed as to promote desirable social policy, and in the light of
the probable social consequences of different methods of their distribution."
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been customary to measure a man's portion of the tax burden by
his riches, when legislatures came to define the "value" that was
to be sought they gave the only definition upon which a consensus
had been reached, and that was market value. Custom, however
well it may serve as an explanation, is a pretty lame reason
for continuing an unsatisfactory practice. Would it not be
better to accept the judgment of experienced observers, one of
whom has said: "Let us be honest and face the fact that no man
on God's earth can find out the value of ninety per cent of tax-
able property. We shall have to recognize that in many if not
in all cases value is an impossible tax basis. This was recog-
nized long ago in Europe..." 24 If the above view holds good
for "many if not all cases" how much more forceful must be
its application to public utilities!
Assessment, however, must go on. The ship of state requires
fuel. Assessors and courts are engaged in doing something with
ad valorem taxes. What is it? The answer is that assessors
and courts and a few legislatures have contrived certain
formulae and procedures for arriving, at a sum that becomes
the tax base. Since the command is to find "value," that, by
the grace of legislatures and courts, is the result. But it is
value for taxation purposes. In tax cases "value" means no
more than the culmination of a process commanded by legisla-
tures, refined and regulated by the courts. The process is named
valuation. The steps in it are not alike in the different states,
although there are certain elements common to most states, cer-
tain ways of going about it, certain data to be taken into ac-
count. These methods and usages have grown up in the course
of a long history of tax valuations and have become more or
less stereotyped. If the end-product of the assessors' labors is
contested in the courts, as it frequently is, the definition of value,
for those cases, must be extended to include the presumptions
and rules and procedure that govern the courts of law.
2-1F. R. Fairchild, NAT. TAx ASS'N PROCEEDINGS (1927) 277. The
familiar concept of value, though defined by statutes, has left the assessors
to 'whom its definitions are directed in great confusion. See Rifkind,
op. cit. supra note 14; Tunnell op. cit. supra note S.
Dr. T. W. Page, speaking before the National Tax Association, said:
.. value is no proper basis for taxation.... As long as we have the
property tax, it is just as well to have the law read very much as it does
now. It matters very little how the definition of value is phrased. It may
be called market value, or fair market value in money, or the law may
add any number of descriptive terms.
"In any event, the practice in taxation will continue to be something very





Modes of assessment, calculated to reach intangible values, vary
from state to state. The favored technique, so far as official
endorsement is concerned, is one that for want of a better name
might be called the "eclectic" technique. Many courts, instead
of laying down some particular and fixed method of valuation,
have declared that all relevant data should be "considered" and
that the results of no single method should be deemed conclu-
sive.25  The varioua methods in use are capitalization of net
earnings, market value of securities, cost of reproduction new,
original cost; other data considered relevant are gross earnings,
book value, value as determined by regulatory bodies, and price
for which the business has actually been sold. Tax cases have
brought forth but little complaint against such a method of
dealing with the data, if it may be called a method; in rate valu-
ation cases there is a growing ferment of rebellion against it.
"It cannot be," says one court, "that the repetition of a mere
legalistic formula before'the declaration of the trial court's final
determination is sufficient to bless and sanctify the result, no
matter what it may be." 20 The same sentiment has found equally
strong expression in other quarters.2 7 The basis of objection of
rate-making cases, would seem equally to exist in tax cases. The
virtual absence of protest in tax cases may perhaps be explained,
though not excused, on the ground that the financial stake has
not been as great and hence the cases have not been as hotly
contested. In nearly all cases, the process of "considering" the
data remains cryptic and unrevealed. Occasionally, it appears,
an average of the results of various methods has been struck
and the resulting sum used.2 8 Broadly speaking, it seems to be
25 Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 40 (1923); Chicago
& N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, 285 Fed. 425 (D. S. D. S. D. 1922), decree re-
versed on other grounds, 289 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) ; Harris Trust
& Savings Bank v. Earl, 26 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Baltimore
& Ohio S. W. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 177 Ky. 566, 198 S. NV. 35 (1917);
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. State, 111 Neb. 362, 197 N. W. 114 (1923);
State v. Savage, supra note 3.
20Rosenberry, J., in Waukesha Gas & Electric Co. v. Commission, 181
Wis. 281, 294, 194 N. W. 846, 851 (1923).
27 See Matthews, The Effect of the Recent Decisions of the Suprerno
Court on Reproduction Cost as a Test of Value, (1924) 37 HARv. L. Ru'.
431, 460-462, quoting fror Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed,
231, 236 (D. S. D. N. Y. 1920) and Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Com-
mission, 292 Fed. 139, 143, 144 (E. D. Mich. 1923). Cf. Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Corn-
mission, 262 U. S. 276, 294-296, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 548-549 (1923).
28 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. State, supra note 25. Of. the statement
of the court in a rate valuation case, speaking of cost of reproduction and
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felt that a possible range of sums is set by the results of the
several methods and the other relevant data, and that almost
any sum within that range is a permissible one. Other courts,
while giving a sort of lip service to the "eclectic" method show
clearly that they favor some particular method above the others,
using the others merely to satisfy the formality of "considering"
all relevant data.2 9 A favorite combination consists of the capi-
talization of net earnings and the stock-and-bond (market value
of securities) methods20
The datum that overshadows all others 31 except the market
value of securities, however, is earnings; and by far the most
favored method is capitalization of net earnings. Even the stock-
and-bond method derives much of its prestige for validity from
the fact that security values depend largely upon earnings, al-
though one of its superior virtues, it will be seen, is supposed to
lie in the fact that in some cases it reflects factors not shown
by earnings. Although they are generally used in connection
with other data, no one could fail to perceive from reading the
general run of cases that, in spite of occasional expressions of
distrust,3 2 much the greatest reliance is placed on earnings; and
in some cases, capitalization of net earnings has been the sole
original cost: "It would be understandable to say that the two estimates
should be averaged, but such a rule could obviously command no support,
because it would correspond to no relevant considerations of policy." Con-
solidated Gas Co. v. Newton, supra note 27, at 236.
21 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, 13 F. (2d) 442 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926),
cert. granted, 273 U. S. 680, 47 Sup. Ct. 112 (1926), writ dismissed, 273
U. S. 775, 47 Sup. Ct. 332 (1927) (stock and bond method mainly relied
on); Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, 31 F. (2d) 587 CE. D. Ill. 1929)
(net earnings).
30 State v. Pullman Co., supra note 3; Illinois Central R. R. v. Greene,
244 U. S. 555, 37 Sup. Ct. 697 (1917); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland,
supra note 29.
31 Some of the other kinds of data may be laid out of account because
their use has been too scanty to warrant extended treatment. Among these
are the price at which property has been sold and original cost. The former,
while the most realistic market value likely to be attained if the time of
sale is close to the day of assessment, is too seldom available to be of much
importance. It has been used. See Marshalltown Light, Power & Ry. Co.
v. Welker, 185 Iowa 165, 170 N. W. 384 (1919). Of course, if the sale
is forced, the sale price is of no value. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank
v. Earl, supra note 25, at 619.
Original cost is also of decidedly minor importance and has been re-
jected in some cases. Cincinnati Southern Ry. v. Guenther, 19 Fed. 395
(C. C. Tenn. 1884), Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., supra note 3. For the
nature of its application when used, see State v. Central Pac. Co., 10
Nev. 47 (1875), quoted with approval in Great Northern Ry. v. Okanogan
County, 223 Fed. 198 (E. D. Wash. 1915).
For reproduction cost, see infra note 75.
- Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); cf.




Because of its importance, the method merits some consider-
ation in detail.34 Briefly stated, it consists in the ascertainment
of net earnings, often a rather difficult task; assuming a rate,
the one adopted usually being considered a fair rate of return
on the property; and capitalizing the earnings,-that is, dividing
the net earnings by the rate, the quotient representing the sum
which, at the fair return, yields the net income actually realized.
That sum is taken to be value.3 5 Some of the difficulties that
beset the way of this method are worth noting.
What are net earnings?
Roughly speaking, gross earnings minus certain deductions,
mainly operating expenses, equal net earnings. Although it has
been asserted that actual earnings are not necessarily the proper
basis of calculation under this method, but rather what the
earnings would have been under competent management," most
courts have been satisfied to use actual earnings. But they must
be earnings; it is not sufficient in calculating earnings to use
3 "It is true that no statute prescribes the net earnings rule as the
method by which the value of a special franchise is to be computed, nor
is there any decision of the courts that this method is to be exclusively
adopted. It is also true that that method of computation is not universally
applicable. Nevertheless, in ordinary cases it is the best practical method
that the taxing officers and the courts have as yet been able to evolve."
Cullen, J., in People ex rel. Hudson & M. R. R. v. State Board of Tax
Com'rs, 203 N. Y. 119, 130, 96 N. E. 435, 439 (1911) ; Louisville & X. R. R.
v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 37 Sup. Ct. 683 (1917) ; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v.
Lewis, 12 F. (2d) 802 (E. D. Ky. 1925); Baton Rouge Electric Co. v.
Board of StateAffairs, 149 La. 383, 89 So. 244 (1921); People ox rel
Third Ave. R. R. v. State Board of Tax Com'rs., 212 N. Y. 472, 106 N. E.
1041 (1914) ; State v. Virginia & T. R. R., 24 Nev. 53, 50 Pac. 607 (1897) ;
Oregon & C. R. R. v. Jackson County, 38 Ore. 589, 64 Pac. 307 (1901),
order modified, 38 Ore. 589, 65 Pac. 369 (1901) (valuation of road-bed).
34 The method used under the Kentucky statutes, which have occasioned
more valuation litigation, perhaps, than those of any other state with the
exception of New York, will serve well as an example. Suppose a rail-
road is to be valued. The first step is to determine the value of the total
corporate property-"total capital stock" as it is called-by capitalizing
net earnings at an assumed rate. To Kentucky is apportioned a share
of the sum so determined on the basis of track mileage, i.o., the propor-
tion that the miles of track of the railroad in Kentucky bear to the total
track mileage of the company. From the sum so apportioned is deducted
the assessed value of the tangible property in the state, tangible property
being separately assessed by different authorities. The sum remaining is
taken to be "franchise" or intangible value. Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Greene, supra note 33. In other jurisdictions there are a number of varia-
tions on these steps to reach the same end.
3 For a consideration of fact and theory in great detail in particular
cases, see the chapters entitled "Capitalized Earning Power as Evidence
of the Value of Property," in DODD, STOCK WATERING (1930).
sr Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Earl, supra note 25; State v. Vir-
ginia & T. R. R., supra note 33.
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dividends since they may have been paid out of surplus.'7
Deductions from gross earnings have contributed a number of
issues to litigation, each comparatively insignificant, in itself,
but cumulatively important. Maintenance, depreciation, and
obsolescence head the list.:" Others are income from the securi-
ties of other companies, 39 income from tax exempt securities,
rent from real estate in other jurisdictions,41 expenses incurred
in the sale of securities,-' and interest on borrowed money in-
vested in plant.43 This list, while not exhaustive, conveys some
idea of the elements that may be contested at this point.
Where do courts get the rate which they use as the divisor in
the capitalization process? The rate is a peculiarly vital element
in the process; five per cent instead of six may make a difference
37 People ex tel. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Feitner, 78 App. Div. 313, 79
N. Y. Supp. 975 (1st Dep't 1903).
38 Failure to make deductions for these items is, of course, error. Baton
Rouge Electric Company v. Board of State Affairs, supra note 33; People
ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. Tax Com'rs, 196 N. Y. 39, 89 N. E.
581 (1909) (allowance had been made for depreciation, but not for main-
tenance). It has been held that in the absence of evidence as to deprecia-
tion, it would be presumed to have been cared for out of current operat-
ing expenses. In re Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., supra note 3. Straight
line method of computing depreciation has been approved by use. People
ex Tel. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. State Tax Comm., 218 App.
Div. 44, 217 N. Y. Supp. 707 (3d Dep't 1926), mdificd and aff'd 247
N. Y. 281, 160 N. E. 371 (1928); Lake Charles Ry., Light & Waterworks
Co. v. Reid, 152 La. 476, 93 So. 743 (1922); but ef. Baton Rouge Electric
Co. v. Board of State Affairs, supra note 33. As the case last cited points
out, looseness of terminology is so abundant in discussions of these items
that it is not always clear what courts mean when discussing them.
39 If the securities are held to be a part of the unit making up the busi-
ness, income from them cannot be deducted from gross earnings. Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. v. Lewis, supra note 33. No good criterion has been de-
veloped as to when such securities are a part of the unit. The argument
that they should be held part of the unit because they enhance credit
did not prevail in Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498 (1904);
cf. the Lewis Case at 806.
40 Such securities may not at the time be producing income, so that when
deductions are made from gross earnings, no deductions for very valuable
property which is exempt will result if the only way for providing such
exemption is the deduction of the income from such property. The Supreme
Court has nevertheless upheld an assessment which allowed only in that
way for tax exempt securities. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Greene, supra
note 33.
43 Such rent is of course a proper deduction. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v.
Lewis, supra note 33.
- Where income attributable to tangible property is separated from
that attributable to intangible property an amount set aside for amortiza-
tion of expenses incurred in the sale of bonds is not deductible from
income attributable to intangibles because the fair return on tangibles
should include it. People ex tel. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Tax Comm., 247 N. Y. 281, 160 N. E. 371 (1928).
43Lake Charles Ry., Light & Waterworks Co. v. Reid, supra note 38.
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of millions in the quotient. Yet, unaccountably, this issue has
not been as much contested as some of the others. The rate is
often simply assumed without discussion.44 The Supreme Court
seems to have put its imprimatur upon any way of arriving at
the rate, including that of mere assumption of it." In an earlier
day, when these cases were sometimes tried to juries, the ques-
tion of the proper rate, togetheil with many other questions,
was left to the jury.4 In one case the assessors reached a rate
"by taking the plaintiff's mileage in each of the States in which
it operates, multiplying this by the legal rate of interest in that
State, and dividing the total of the products by the total mileage
... ;" and to counsel's objections the court answered merely that
their criticisms were directed at "the conclusion of the Board
upon a question of fact which is not properly subject to review
by the courts." 4T Another federal court, rejecting the contention
that the rate of capitalization should be the same as the rate of
interest payable on the road's first mortgage bonds, adopted a
rate approved in the Interstate Commerce Act.49 In a case
where the assessment of tangibles was separate from the assess-
ment of intangibles, and one of the issues was the proper rate
of return on the tangibles, one court talked in terms found
usually in rate-making valuations, and relied largely upon a
rate-making decision.4" The court declared that judicial notice
might be taken of the rate required to induce investors to put
their money into enterprises of the kind in question; and that
while it is proper to take evidence on the point, if the parties
see fit to offer it, the court could assume the rate if no evidence
were offered.
In jurisdictions in which tangibles are assessed separately
from intangibles, 50 the issue also arises sometimes whether the
44 Martineau v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 141 Ark. 596, 217 S. W. 807
(1920); Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R. v. Commonwealth, supra note 25;
see In re Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., State v. Pullman Co., both sutpra
note 3.
45 Illinois Central R. R. v. Greene supra note 30, in which Pitney, J.,
at 562, 37 Sup. Ct. at 700 said: "The District Court properly held . . .
that no fundamentally wrong principle was involved in determining
what rate of interest should be used in capitalizing . . ."
46 State v. Virginia & T. R. R., supra note 33. The jury heard some
evidence, although not a great deal, bearing on the rate of interest on
investments of this kind. The evidence varied from 6 to 12 per cont
the jury found 6, and the court held them to be justified in their finding.
4Louisville & N. R. R. v. Greene, supra note 33, at 542, 37 Sup. Ct.
at 692.
48 Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, supra, note 29.
49 People ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. Tax Com'rs, supra note 38.
so Practice differs in the matter of assessing intangible values separately
assess both together. The whole property is valued as a unit and an
from tangible. A number of jurisdictions do not consider them apart but
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rate of return to be used as a divisor should be the same for
each. Different answers have been given. Louisiana holds that
the rate ought to be the same; 51 New York, that the rate on
intangibles should be a little higher in order "to provide against
unforeseen contingencies that may arise in the prosecution of
the business of the corporation." Z2
The other leading method of valuation, the stock-and-bond
method, has encountered unusually variant climates of opinion.
Discussion of it in cases turns on a usually final issue: Shall it
be employed at all? The essence of the method and the expres-
sion of approval are happily united in language of Mr. Justice
Miller's that has become classical:
"It is therefore obvious, that, when you have ascertained the
current cash value of the whole funded debt, and the current
cash value of the entire number of shares, you have, by the ac-
tion of those who above all others can best estimate it, ascer-
tained the true value of the road, all its property, its capital
stock, and its franchises; for these are all represented by the
value of its bonded debt and of the shares of its capital stock." 63
Although not all courts have thought so highly of the gentle-
men who deal in securities,"4 the method has by and large found
wide favor. The statutes of some states specifically provide for
its use; 5 and it has received special praise in a few cases,-"
apportionment made to the taxing jurisdiction of its share of the total
value. See Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, supra note 29. Other jurisdic-
tions first assess tangibles, apply the rate to their value, deduct the sum
so found from total net earnings and capitalize the remainder to find the
value of intangibles. People ex rel. Hudson & M. R. R. v. State Board
of Tax Com'rs, supra note 33; Lake Charles Ry., Light & Waterworks
Co. v. Reid, supra note 38.
-1 Baton Rouge Electric Co. v. Board of State Affairs, supra note 33;
Lake Charles Ry., Light & Waterworks Co. v. Reid, supra note 38.
52 People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. v. Woodbury, 203 N. Y. 231, 96 N. E.
420 (1911) (2 judges dissenting).
z3 State Railroad Tax Cases, supra note 4, at 605.
-4 "To the person familiar with such matters it is well known that stocks
and bonds do not as a rule at any time represent the money actually in-
vested in a property of the character here in question. It is only necessary
to note the case of bonds sold below par . . . the fraudulent practice of
'watered stock' . . . the effect of the operations of ... the bulls and bears
of Wall-street. . ." Clark, J., in Railroad & Telegraph Cos. v. Board of
Equalizers, 85 Fed. 302, 312 (C. C. Tenn. 1897). For language of the
same tenor, see Chicago Union Traction Co. v. State Board of Equalizers,
112 Fed. 607, 612 (C. C. Ill. 1901).
55 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1, 16 Sup. Ct. 1054
(1896) (use directed by Ind. Stat.); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961 (1888) (provided for by Mass.
statutes).
- Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, su2pra note 29; see Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. Ry. v. State, supra note 25.
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particularly those having to do with corporations with wasting
assets.57 The particular issues arising in the use of this method
do not merit extended separate consideration.55
If this quick view of the methods in the abstract, isolated from
impinging forces, has endowed them with an air of workability
or even of simplicity, a view of them in truer perspective, func-
tioning in the system, robs them of their virtuous guise. Wide
variations in the sums resulting from the several methods, cus-
tomarily used together, is the rule rather than the exception.
Reliance on the results of a single method afford no escape from
variations; for a wide range of sums may result from the use
of a single method. Consider, for example, that in the use of
the net earnings method the rates assumed might be either five
or six per cent, and that the earnings figures used might be
either those for the year preceding the assessment or an average
of earnings over the preceding five years. The permutations of
these data give four sums with a range that may be so wide
as to deprive them of nearly all meaning.
5 Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Lewis, 17 F. (2d) 167 (D. E. 1). Ky.
1926); Floyd v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co., 111 Ohio St. 57, 144
N. E. 703 (1924). See Martineau v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., supra note
44. Companies with wasting assets present a peculiar problem. As the
court in the Cumberland Pipe Line case explains, the assumptions under-
lying the net earnings method do not apply to such companies. It Is
ordinarily assumed in using past net earnings that future earnings will
continue much the same. Obviously this cannot be true of a company with
wasting assets. Therefore, it is argued, the, stock and bond method Is
superior in such cases because security values are supposed to reflect the
probable life of the wasting assets. On assessment day therefore, the court
said that the value was not more than a ". . . sum which, invested at 6
per cent, compounded annually would yield to the purchaser the sum total
of such net income during each of those years, and the market value of
any assets that the plaintiff owned, not a part of its pipe line system."
58 Since stock market quotations are the measure of the market value
of the stock, some other means must be used to arrive at market value If
the stock happens not to be on the market. One substitute has been expert
testimony as to what the stock would or ought to sell for in the market
in the light of its earnings per share. Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnippor,
supra note 29. Then again, some but not all of the company's shares may
be on the market, and the argument has been made that on that account
market quotations led to too high a valuation. The argument did not
prevail. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, supra note 55.
There is also the question of securities in other companies owned by the
taxpaying company. There, as in the earnings method, the test is the vague
one of closeness of relationship. The relationship is not closer merely
-because the company has deposited the securities with a trustee and issued
its own securities against them. Coulter v. Weir, 127 Fed. 897 (C. C. A.
6th, 1904). The factor there stressed that the securities aided in securing
-credit because creditors could reach them was held not to make them part
of the unit. For a contrary and more modern view, see Schnipper case,
supra.
[Vol. 41
TAXATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
Part of the blame for variant results, of course, must be
charged to the fact that it is a variant world. One of the several
important difficulties that must confront any system of assess-
ment is simply the fact of change. One court, with unique and
prophetic insight, recognized this in 1861, near the beginning
of things.59 Values fluctuate, sometimes very violently, as recent
experience abundantly illustrates. Many valuation cases repre-
sent attempts by courts to fix a stable standard for the measure-
ment of value, some criterion that will resist the flux and change
of circumstance. It has not yet been done. New sources of com-
petition develop; wars disrupt economic life; prices rise and
fall; earnings swell and dwindle; securities soar and crash;
ceaseless change is the rule, and the valuation process must
adapt itself to change. The erratic behavior of security quota-
tions has been searingly brought home to everyone. The general
economic conditions behind such fluctuations play havoc also
°with earnings and prices. It is not at all unintelligible, then,
why courts have not cared to go into detail as to the nature of
the process whereby assessors are to "consider" the relevant data
of costs, earnings, and stock-and-bond quotations, and why they
have not indicated, except in a very general way in a few in-
stances, what weight ought to be given to different kinds of data.
One can begin to see the inexorable necessities that drive courts
ultimately to the haven of "discretion" and "judgment."
The fluctuations in business conditions that produce changes
in the indices of value may be reflected in corresponding fluctua-
tions in valuation figures. 0 But since some degree of regularity
is desirable, the attempt is occasionally made to flatten out the
curve of short time trends in business conditions by using an
average of the data for a number of the preceding years. In
one case in which the stock-and-bond method was used, the quo-
tations used represented (1) the average for the five years
preceding the assessment day, (2) the average for the year pre-
ceding that day, (3) the average price on that day.1 This was
a commendable effort; but nowhere is it written that assessors
must follow that procedure. Apparently, they may or may not,
as they see fit. If they are not disposed to use average prices
and choose to use the highest market price during the preceding
period the assessment may nevertheless stand c- Hard times
9 "Values are fluctuating and changeable, as all experience shows. Nor
is it easy, at any one period of time, to lay down a general and satisfac-
tory rate of certain application, in all cases, for the purpose of ascer-
taining the value of many kinds of property subject to taxation .... Such
is peculiarly the case with railroad property and other similar property."
Breese, J., in State v. Illinois Central R. R., 27 Ill. 64, 68 (1801).
,o See State v. Savage, supra note 3, at 766.
61 State v. Pullman Co., supra note 3.
6 Illinois Central R. R. v. Greene, supra. note 30.
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may cause net earnings to melt away and disappear. Use of
the net earnings method is then, of course, precluded.
3 Even
though the method be used, however, it is said that in times of
depression too great reliance should not be placed upon it."
These considerations suggest the further circumstance of in-
solvency. Here, even the most conscientious assessor, in
attempting to mold his practice to the precepts laid down by the
courts, must find himself baffled. The issue is whether any in-
tangible values are to be found in a company that is either
insolvent or barely able to pay running expenses. It arose in
a lower federal court shortly after the Civil War. With aston-
ishing heat Judge Drummond (of renown, if not of blessed
memory, for his use of the labor injunction in administering
railroad receiverships) 6 decided that limping and insolvent
roads had no intangible values; and an injunction was granted
against enforcement of a tax based on a valuation that included
such values.66
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court and
found the assessment valid. 67  One of the roads involved could
barely pay running expenses, but was assessed $2,000,000 for
intangible values in addition to $2,600,000 for tangibles. Its
stock was worthless. Mr. Justice Miller nevertheless declared
the assessment proper; for although the road was not malting
any profit, its franchises were still worth something, it still had
-some going-concern value (although the Justice did not call it
by that name). The other roads were in like circumstances or
worse.
This issue seems to have remained virtually quiescent for
nearly fifty years, although from time to time references are
found to economic conditions resulting in low earnings by rail-
roads." In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court did have one oc-
casion to re-affirm the above holdingY' Soon after that a case
was carried to the Court by the receiver of a Texas railroad who
attacked the assessors' valuation of $39,000,000, of which about
$10,500,000 represented intangible values. The road had under-
gone a reorganization; and if the earnings for the succeeding
year had been capitalized, the resulting sum would have been
less than $1,000,000. The road was again unable to pay fixed
63 Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76, 47 Sup. Ct. 542 (1927).
£4 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, gupra note 25, at 437.
65 See Nelles, A Strike and its Legal Consequences (1931) 40 YALm L. J.
507.
66 Jessup v. Chicago & A. R. R., Fed. Cas. No. 7,300 (C. C. I1. 1875).
6 State Railroad Tax Cases, supra note 53.
68 See Railroad and Tel. Cas. v. Board of Equalizers of Tennosseo, 85
Fed. 302, 310 (C. C. Tenn. 1897); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, supra
note 25, at 437.
69 See Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 590, 34 Sup. Ct. 372, 375 (1914).
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charges, and went into receivership. The Supreme Court, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Brandeis, found nothing amiss in the
assessment and upheld it without discussing the question of
whether there was any intangible value in such a road.7 Since
that had been an issue in the state courts, in which it was finally
held that there were such values, inferentially the Supreme
Court would seem to have held to its established view.
Finally, in Soutthern Railway v. Kentucky,"' the Supreme
Court again dealt with the issue. Mr. Justice Butler spoke for
the court. The road involved was completely controlled by an-
other, and the assessors had valued it as part of a unit together
with the controlling road, with which it had a physical operating
connection. Considered as a separate operating unit, however,
it not merely failed to show net earnings, but showed an actual
deficit. The court held the assessment, which plainly included
intangible values, to be invalid because arbitrary and excessive.72
It is rather astonishing that this was done without so much as
citing or referlink to the three prior Supreme Court decisions
on the matter, or to the early decision of Judge Drummond to
the views of which the court had apparently returned. Some of
those precedents dealt with roads that were admittedly insolvent,
several of them deeply so; and if the courts succeeded in finding
intangible values in such roads, it might be supposed that such
values could be found in solvent roads.
The importance of this briefly sketched history of the point
does not turn on the question of which of the two views is right,
although on that score it is submitted that the earlier view of
the Supreme Court is the better one.73 The significant thing is
7 oBaker v. Druesedow, supra note 25.
7 Supra note 63. This case had been preceded by a decision in a federal
district court concerning a leased road which declared that if gross in-
come did not exceed rent paid plus operating expenses there was no
intangible value upon which a tax could be levied. See Chicago, I. & L.
Ry. v. Lewis, s.spra note 33.
572 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented ostensibly on the basis of the pro-
cedural rule that the court could not consider on review issues not raised
in the courts below. His language, however, seems to indicate a more
fundamental basis. "The importance of the rule of practice is illustrated
by the case at bar. Because the reasonableness of the method of assess-
ment was not questioned below, there is nothing in the record to show
what figures and what method of calculation were used by the taxing
officer. The figures adopted by this court are presented only in the brief
of the plaintiff in error. They are protested by counsel for the common-
wealth. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the inferences drawn from
them are unsound." 274 U. S. at 91, 47 Sup. Ct. at 547.
73 As Mr. Justice Miller argued in the State R. R. Tax Cases, why do
not the bond holders put up the property piece by piece? Obviously be-
cause in doing so they would lose most if not all of the value that arises
out of the fact that the property is an operating unit. Cogent also is the
argument of the court in Druesdow v. Baker, 229 S. W. 493 (Tex. Corn.
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that it becomes necessary to enter another item in the long cata-
logue of assessment obstacles and uncertainties. No assessor
could proceed upon either view with assurance that he would be
upheld. The late unheralded reversal may be merely the pre-
cursor of another. Indeed, in the very next year after the Butler
opinion the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
without mentioning that opinion, upheld a railroad assessment in
Harris Trust & Savings Bank 'v. Earl,T4 that had been attacked
as excessive in view of vanishing earnings.
The court in that case found a new ground, however, upon
which to sustain the assessment in spite of dwindling earnings.
That ground was incompetent management. It is emphasized by
five distinct references to it in the course of the opinion. "Earn-
ing capacity" to some courts, then, means not what a road is
earning, but what it would earn under competent management.
In the light of the complexity of present day operating condi-
tions, bus and water competition, automobile competition, which
is discussed in the case, as well as a host of 'other factors, how
"earning capacity" is to be found becomes a baffling puzzle, es-
pecially the process of allocating to management and to other
factors their proper share of responsibility for disappearing
earnings. If there were not enough hypothetical elements in the
valuation process before, this supplies the final and crowning
touch.
III
It is doubtless to be expected not only that the two valuation
processes that are carried out on the grandest scale, those for
rate-making and for tax assessment, should command more at-
tention than others, but also that between these two there should
be some interchange of ideas. Courts and assessors seem, at any
rate, to have drawn upon rate-making valuations for ideas.7
App. 1921), that the very fact of a receivership attests the existence of
intangible values, the preservation of which is the chief task of the re-
ceiver. It is safe to assume that no sale of the properties would be made
on the basis of the mere junk value of their component parts, yet what
else but that is Mr. Justice Butler contending for as the basis of a tax
assessment?
-7- Supra note 25.
75 The use by some courts of the cost of reproduction new seems to have
its source, in some cases, in analogy to rate-making cases. In tax cases
its use is barren of the usual arguments accompanying its use in rate
cases. The method has received brief approval, Washington Water Power
Co. v. Kootenai County, 270 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); Long Dock
Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 89 N. J. L. 108, 97 AtI. 900, aff'd, 90
N. J. L. 701, 101 Atl. 367 (1916); cf. People ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply
Co. v. Tax Com'rs, supra note 38; and also high praise. See Clark, J,
in Railroad & Telephone Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, supra note 68, at 313.
Some courts have dismissed the method with little or no discussion. Chicago
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On the issue whether the reports of a railroad to the Interstate
Commerce Commission are admissible evidence in .1 tax valua-
tion, there have been holdings both ways.70 Courts have availed
themselves of the Commission's data: its rate of capitalization
is of influence in the net earnings method; and expert testimony,
common in tax valuations as it is in others of all kinds, is some-
times based on the Commission's price, cost, and other data.T
But more important than other contacts between the two kinds
of valuations is the insistence by some that value for both pur-
poses is identical. This notion has had the support of referees
appointed to take evidence on the issue of value,1 of certain
courts,7 9 and of at least one legislature, which for a time em-
bodied it in statutes.'
& N. W. Ry. v. Eveland, supra note 29; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sullivan,
supra. note 3 (method rejected because it excludes intangible values which
may be greater than tangible); though its use be recognized as proper,
it will not be considered if depreciation is wrongly calculated, State v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., supra note 3, or if a formula invoked in
an attempt to take changing price levels into account is found to be too
complex and arbitrary. See Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, supra note
29. On the whole this method in tax valuations is quite unimportant.
76 That they are admissible: People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Burke,
221 App. Div. 248, 223 N. Y. Supp. 168 (4th Dep't 1927); Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ky. v. State, supra note 25; see Chicago Great Western Ry. v. Kendall,
266 U. S. 94, 100, 45 Sup. Ct. 55, 57 (1924). That they are not admissible:
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sullivan, supra note 3; Chicago & N. W. Ry.
v. Eveland, supra note 29.
77 Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, supra note 29; see Chicago R. I. &
P. Ry. -. State, supra note 25.
78 In re Assessment of Western Union Telegraph Co., su2pra. note 3. The
referee had concluded ". .. as a matter of law that the valuation of prop-
erty for the purpose of rate making within the state, and the valuation
'of property for the purposes of taxation should be one and the same."
The court decided that he had erred in giving too much weight to the
value for rate-making purposes, and upheld the assessors' valuation of
$1,450,684 as against the referee's finding of $414,481, which was approxi-
mately the rate-base figure.
79Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai County, supra note 75;
Railroad and Telephone Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, mtpra. note 68; Mobile
& 0. R. R. v. Schnipper, supra note 29; State v. Savage, supra note 3, at
755, 91 N. W. at '124, where the court said: "The property can have
but one true value, whatever may be the purpose of the investigation."
so See State ex rel. Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535,
116 Pac. 7 (1911); Spokane & I. E. R. R. v. Spokane County, 75 Wash.
72, 134 Pac. 688 (1913), writ of error dismissed, 238 U. S. 642, 35 Sup.
Ct. 284 (1914); Oregon-Washington R. R. & N. Co., v. Thurston County,
98 Wash. 218, 167 Pac. 930 (1917), writ of error dismissed, 246 U. S.
678, 38 Sup. Ct. 335 (1918).
The legislature apparently sought to retreat from the iron-bound rule
of these cases by modifying the language of the earlier statute, which
made the findings of the Public Service Commission conclusive evidence
of the facts stated in such findings, by inserting the clause "except as a
basis for taxation." The later form also omits the earlier provision that
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Although it does not appear that the Supreme Court has
spoken on this issue, it is noteworthy that Mr. Justice Butler
has long been a leading advocate of the idea that value for
different purposes is the same. In one of the cases in which he
appeared as counsel for a railroad, before his appointment to the
bench, he contended that "value" means economic value-"Value
is power in exchange"--; he identified value for rate-maling
purposes with value for purposes of taking property in con-
demnation proceedings, and he declared that "... . in stating the
rule for determining value in general terms it is difficult to
improve on the statement in Smyth v. Ames." "I It was also con-
tended that "... . so far as the property is used in transportation
service or is taken in condemnation, its value at the same time
is the same whether the inquiry may relate to rates or eminent
domain or assessment for taxation or capitalization." 82 One is
prepared to find, therefore, that in support of the court's decision
on one of the main issues in Southern Railway v. Kentucky, a
tax valuation case, Mr. Justice Butler cited Smyth v. Ames 8
and a case in which one of the issues was the price to be paid
by a city for a local utility upon exercising an option to pur-
chase.84 The Justice was not alone in his views on the identity
of values, for his brethren among railroad counsel were urging
the same notions.8 If, then, owing to the assiduity of these men,
some courts have been brought around to their views, any
sympathy that might be felt for railroads on account of their
tax burden must be tempered by the knowledge that they labored
to bring it upon themselves. "Perhaps the valuation counsel
were not completely aware, in taking this position, that they
were forging a two-edged sword which might be used against
them in tax cases, or perhaps they were aware of this fact, but
were willing to accept the danger of higher tax assessments in
order to gain the much greater benefit of permission to charge
higher railway rates." 86 In neither event does one feel that the
value as found by the commission should be taken as value for assessment
and taxation. Compare the earlier form as set out in the Clausen Case
above, with WAsH. Co ip. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 10,441. There
is nothing, however, to prevent assessors and courts from using rate.
making value if they see fit.81 Tunnell, Value for Taxation and for Rate-Making (1927) 35 JoUi.
POL. ECON. 1, 19-22, quoting from a brief of 1027 printed pages presented
by Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Leslie Craven to the Interstate Commerce
Commission on behalf of the Texas Midland R. R., 75 1. C. C. 1 (1918).
8 Tunnel, op. cit. supra note 81, at 22.
83 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
84 City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 30 Sup, Ct. 615
(1910).
15 Tunnell, op. cit. supra note 81.
80 Bonbright, May the Same Property Have Different 'alues for Differ-
ent Purposes? NAT. TAX ASS'N PROCEEDINGS (1927) 279, 289.
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railroads have been much abused so far as taxation is concerned.
In the great majority of cases, no mention is made of valuation
for rate-making purposes; the inquiries are carried on entirely
independently and without correlation. Thus it happens that
while the object of inquiry in both types of valuation is "value,"
the results are quite disparate. 7 Examples could be multiplied;
one of the more interesting ones, Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Eve-
land,8 decided by a court which explicitly rejects the notion of
the identity of value for rate-making and taxation purposes,
must suffice. The road, objecting to the amount at which its
property had been assessed, paid taxes on a basis of a value of
$29,183,208 or about 70% of the state's figure, and brought suit
for an injunction against collection of any amount based on a
higher assessment. The road's value figure was allowed to stand
because it most nearly approximated the results of the methods
that have in the long course of tax usuage come to be the beaten
pathway to value. It is illuminating to note the other values
that had been placed on the road and their fate in the trial
ordeal. The $52,467,000 at which the road carried the property
on its books was dismissed on the ground that it represented cost
and not value. The sum of $47,528,900 which appeared in the
road's own report to the state tax commission was brushed aside
because it was based on cost of reproduction with no allowance
for depreciation, and also because the same report contained
much lower figures by the company's experts under the heading
"fair cash value." The Interstate Commerce Commission's engi-
neers had valued the road at $35,500,000, a sum which, at the
time, the road had claimed to be too low by $6,651,000. This sum
the court dismissed by saying that "these valuations were not for
the purposes of taxation, wherein use for railroad purposes and
market value of stocks and bonds are chief factors, but for rate-
making purposes, wherein a very different basis for valuation
prevails." Also that "those valuations were based on prices and
costs-not on value for taxation or sale." 6D The two conflicting
8 Tunnell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 274, reports a case in which the
Interstate Commerce Commission valued railroad property at $540,000;
a number of years later the assessors valued it at $56,400. Shortly there-
after it was sold for $25,000. At p. 273, he reports another case in which
the I. C. C. valuation was $1,365,000 in 1916; the road was asscssed at
$231,400 in 1925, and $406,450 in 1926, years of much higher price and
wage levels than 1916. Shortly before the 1926 assessment, the road sold
for $700,000. According to Tunnell's report, the state is one in which
assessors are directed by law to follow the findings of the I. C. C., but
when assessors did so, the road brought suit in the Supreme Court of the
state for a reduction, and succeeded in getting one to the level of the
previous year.




views on this issue would, in the light of the fact that the
Supreme Court refused to review the Eveland case and has not
formally passed on the question, make it appear that counsel
who wish to introduce evidence of value for rate-making in a
tax valuation case will first be obliged to ascertain the attitude
prevailing in their particular circuit or even in a particular
court.
The chief arguments advanced by courts that believe that the
two values ought to be the same center about the specious though
superficially appealing fairness and justice of holding them the
same, and the supposed consequence that companies will be re-
strained from claiming too high a valuation because of taxes and
too low a valuation because of rates. These ignore the obvious
consideration that generally the privilege of charging higher
rates far outweighs the risk of higher taxes. There is, it may
be conceded, something that clashes with the prevailing sense of
the fitness of things in the spectacle of a company striving
mightily for high rate and low tax valuations. But this clash
may be traced to a confusion of thought, to be found on all levels
of thinking about valuation matters, resulting from the use of
"question begging epithets." 90 To fix a rate base is one thing;
to fix a tax base quite another. Unfortunately, the word "valua-
tion" is part of our verbal currency in talking about both proces-
ses. The mere fact that both are called "valuation" is enough
to account for much confusion. As a matter of theory, the dif-
ference in function that is being performed by courts in the two
valuations is a sufficient explanation, and also a justification,
if any were needed, for the disparity between the values found in
the two kinds of processes. Courts in rate cases are not secding
value, they are creating it.91 As a practical matter, the reason
for differences in the two values is often to be found in the
simple fact that no two bodies of men would value the same
properties in the same way or with like results. The sheer
clumsiness of our contrivances for control are quite as much
parf of the picture as diligent self-seeking by the "interests ;"
for tax valuations have not infrequently been much greater than
rate valuations in the past, and there is no reason to doubt that
they will sometimes be so in the future.
IV
More important practically than most of the substantive ele-
ments of this piece of tax machinery are the so-called procedural
90 See Hadley, The Meaning of Valuation (1928) 18 AME. ECON. RV.
173, 176.
91 See Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 7, at 502-506; Greencastlo Water-
works Co. v. Public Service Commission, 31 F. (2d) 600 (S. D. Ind. 1929).
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elements; for these probably hold the true inwardness and the
deeper significances of the whole matter.
That public utilities and similar corporations are sometimes
known as public service corporations and are said to be affected
with a public interest does not obscure the fact that their
primary goal is still profit. All can understand, therefore, al-
though many would condemn, their use of the machinery of the
law to enhance profits. They were not the first to discover that
the capital use value of money is, in many instances, much
greater than the cost of the litigation by which ultimate payment
may be postponed. There is always the chance, moreover, that
out of the gamble of litigation, particularly over so complex a
matter as a tax assessment, they may emerge the winners. They
may never be obliged to pay the money at all.
The practice, at least in earlier times, was the simple one of
procuring an injunction against the collection of any of the tax
pending a judicial determination of the amount due. Obviously
enough, if the amount due, though disputed, were large, the law's
delays allowed the tax money to earn interest far in excess of
court costs. Mr. Justice Miller did what he could in the State
Railroad Tax-o Cases to end the practice by calling attention to it,
denouncing it, and suggesting a partial remedy. He held that
the company "must first pay what is conceded to be due, or what
can be seen to be due on the face of the bill, or be shown by
affidavits whether conceded or not, before the preliminary in-
junction should granted." 92 That was in 1875. The justice was
too sanguine about the success of his remedy. He was "satisfied
that an observance of this principle would prevent the larger
part of the suits for restraining collection of taxes which now
come into the courts." He could not foresee the immense growth
in number and size of corporations and corporate properties of
all kinds that was shortly to ensue. Though he then thought
the tax demands of state and nation heavy, he could not foresee
their manifold increase. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that in
many instances it still remains profitable to restrain collection
of the amount of the tax beyond that "conceded" to be due.2  An
estimate of the present extent of the practice is a matter of con-
jecture and speculation.
Courts have not been without insight into the problems con-
fronting assessors. Assessors are, after all, human beings strug-
gling as best they can to perform a certain task with inadequate
tools. They are not to blame if industrial growth outstripped
that of the tax system so that their task is like attempting to
cover a full grown man with a child's garments. It is not their
t-2 Supra note 4, at 617.




fault that what statutes have set them to measure does not exist
as to public utilities, so that their nominal task is impossible;
nor that the statutes have supplied definitions that fail to define.
So far as assessors' fault as a source of difficulty is concerned,
downright fraud is entirely negligible and has no place in the
discussion. Of ineptitude there has been some, but not enough
to account for more than a small part of assessment troubles.
Mr. Justice Miller, after recognizing in part the imperfection of
the system, was also moved to say:
"The application being made by men whose judgments and
opinions must vary as they are affected by all the circumstances
brought to bear upon each individual, the result must inevitably
partake largely of the imperfection of human nature, and of the
evidence on which human judgment is founded." "I
This attitude he shared with other judges and other courts.
The mere fact, therefore, that counsel are able to discover to the
court some of the imperfections that must inevitably characterize
assessments is not a reason for scrapping the assessment. Hence
we find the following statement, or one of like tenor, appearing
in these cases with pious regularity:
"The findings of an official body such as the Board of Valua-
tion and Assessment, made ... after a hearing and upon notice to
the taxpayer, are quasi-judicial in their character, and are not
to be set aside or disregarded by the courts unless it is made
to appear that the body proceeded upon an erroneous principle
or adopted an improper mode of estimating the value of the
franchise or unless fraud appears." 0
This is a very dubious kind of principle. It probably worries
company counsel very little. If Mr. Justice Holmes or a like
minded judge happens to be enunciating it, then, indeed, counsel
may be very certain that the assessment will stand unless some-
thing is profoundly and radically wrong.0 On the other hand,
it will not unduly tax the ingenuity of any court, if for any
reason it disagrees with the assessment, to find that the assess-
ment is based on a "fundamentally erroneous principle."
The above rule, however, has been bolstered by another: the
mental processes of assessors during the valuation cannot be in-
quired into later by cross-examination of members of the asses-
sing -body. Assessors have in many cases been very secretive
04 State Railroad Tax Cases, supra note 4, at 612.
05 Pitney, J., in Louisville & N. R. R. v. Greene, supra note 33, at 536,
37 Sup. Ct. at 690.
96 See, for example, the opinion in Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204
U. S. 585, 27 Sup. Ct. 326 (1907).
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about their methods, disclosing nothing of how they reached
thei3 results. What is more, Mr. Justice Holmes held in an
opinion reminiscent of the classic Lochner dissent, they cannot
be made to tell. In Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock,T counsel
for the company having argued that the assessors were arbitrary
at various points, the Justice said:
"But the action does not appear to have been arbitrary except
in the sense in which many honest and sensible judgments are so.
They express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis
and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impres-
sions which may be beneath consciousness without losing their
worth. The Board was created for the purpose of using its judg-
ment and knowledge.... Within its jurisdiction, except, as we
have said, in the case of fraud or a clearly shown adoption of
wrong principles, it is the ultimate guardian of certain rights.
The State has confided those rights to its protection and has
trusted to its honor and capacity as it confides the protection of
other social relations to the courts of law. Somewhere there must
be an end. We are of opinion that whatever grounds for uneasi-
ness may be perceived nothing has been proved so clearly and
palpably as it should be proved ... in order to warrant these
appeals to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Circuit Court." Is
Thus the judicial formula, as set down by our greatest jurist,
amounts in practice to this, that we must put our trust in the
servants of the state, and for the rest trust in God. It might
well be that in time nearly everyone could become reconciled to
reliance on the "intuition of experience that outruns analysis"-
if only it were true that experience is enough to bring to the
problem. That, unfortunately, has proved to be untrue.
One of the consequences of the policy of secrecy and the rule
upholding it is to throw the valuation burden in a contested case
very largely on the courts, who are ill-equipped and not properly
organized to cope with it.99 When the valuation issue gets to
97Supra note 96.
9s Ibid. 596, 27 Sup. Ct. at 329.
One jurisdiction, at least, has long dissented from Mr. Justice Holmes'
view. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore, 105 DId. 43, 65 Atl. 628 (1907);
Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission, 159 Mld. 359, 151 Atl.
S9 (1930).
99Cf. Comment (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 81. Indeed, we have judicial confes-
sion of the fact in a tax case, United New Jersey R. R. Canal Co. v. State
Board of Taxes and Assessment, 100 N. J. L. 131, 136, 125 At. 335, 336,
337 (1924), in which the court, commenting on a statutory provision that
assessors should be "entitled to use their personal knowledge and judgment
as to the value of property," said: "It is quite obvious in reading this
bewildering and confusing record what (the) purpose was. The record
in this case is an apt illustration of the wisdom of the legislature in insert-
ing such a provision in the statute."
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* law, oftentimes all that the court has to review is a sum,
10 and
the issue takes this form: Is the sum so far from value that it
indicates the use of a fundamentally erroneous principle in the
valuation process? The trial court must then either invoke the
aid of a referee to take evidence, or take the voluminous evidence
itself. On review by appellate courts, then, the opinions are
concerned largely with valuation methods sanctioned by lower
courts and referees instead of methods used by assessors. The
history of an assessment might run something like this: (1)
report of the company to the assessing body stating the corn-,
pany's valuation of its own properties; (2) assessment by the
official body; (3) finding by a referee on direction of the trial
court; (4) approval, modification, or rejection by the trial court;
(5) if the trial court is a state court, appeal to the highest state
court; or, if the trial court is a federal court, appeal to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals; (6) appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Probably the notions of value and valuation of no two
persons concerned in the long ordeal of the law begin to coin-
cide.101
Behind these rules, designed to keep an assessment firmly
standing if possible, one senses something more fundamental than
judicial recognition of imperfections in tax systems and human
frailties in assessors. Self-preservation is the first law not only
of nature but also of states. Our judges have been blessed with
foresight of the disastrous consequences that must ensue from
a tieing up, from whatever cause, of too large a proportion of the
revenues. 102 The recent experience of certain states and munici-
palities has dramatically proved judges' fears to be well founded.
"It takes revenue to maintain the state government and the sub-
divisions thereof," said one court revealingly, "... . and where it
appears to this court that all the provisions of law relative to
making the levy have been substantially complied with, we will
hold the levy valid." 103 The conjunction of these two ideas is
surely not without significance. The sharper and more pressing
the judicial awareness of the difficulties of assessment under pre-
vailing methods, the more apparent becomes the necessity for
rules and presumptions to uphold assessments. The assessor's
task is formidable; his tools are outmoded and inadequate; the
pitfalls along the way are innumerable. In proportion as these
things are true, the less enlightened can be the justice adminis-
tered in these tax cases if governments are to have money with
100oCf. the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis quoted mtpra note 13.
101 See Detroit Citizens' Street-Railway Company v. Common Council of
Detroit, 125 Mich. 673, 705, 85 N. W. 96, 107 (1901).
10 See Chicago Great Western Ry. v. Kendall, supra note 76, at 97, 101,
45 Sup. Ct. at 56, 57.
103 Bonaparte v. Nelson, 142 Okla. 54, 59, 285 Pac. 100, 104 (1929).
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which to function. The materials available to counsel out of
which to fashion a case against an assessment are unusually
abundant. The possible points of attack are many. It becomes
plain, therefore, that the system needs some sort of hypodermic
in the form of the rules just discussed to "jack it up" and keep
it functioning.
Still, the inquirer finds that in spite of these rules a large pro-
portion of the litigated cases result in overthrow or modification
of the assessments. Since it cannot be denied that a presumption
is a useful judicial device, there is a certain plausibility in the
opinion that the presumption of correctness is merely a con-
venient tool in the hands of judges who happen to be disposed
for any reasons to uphold the assessment; but this does not pre-
clude but rather invites inquiry into what forces determine
whether the tool shall be used or not. It is not to be doubted
that in the interest of the state there is a more or less stiff
judicial resistance to attempted revision of assessments, al-
though it may be owned that the stiffness of the resistance varies
with the times and with the judges. Yet the clusters of facts
that make parties call upon the law for redress are plainly
visible on the very fringes of the wilderness of single instance.
Some have already appeared in these pages. When the assess-
ment of a railroad leaps from $6,500,398 to $12,500,000 in a
single year, it is a matter of course that the road will move vig-
orously to protect itself.104 When assessors can conclude that a
railroad is worth $365,559,617, while the company admits a value
of not more than $189,185,593, and a commissioner appointed
to take evidence on the issue of value can find a value of only
$117,680,202,05 who can rationally be surprised if the courts
radically alter the assessment? Is not the stage set for resort
to law when tax authorities value property in June at $1,492,815
and reply to the company's October protest with a revised value
of $3,700,713, for which they can advance perfectly plausible
reasons? 106 These are random samples out of a large company.
The presumption, then, and the resistance to which it gives effect
is a real force; the many cases in which assessments have been
altered attest how uncertain, capricious, and rachitic are the
ways of the system.
If there is anything in this analysis, it is idle to decry the rules
that leave courts and corporations in the dark as to how assess-
ments were arrived at and require courts to adjudicate disputes
in ignorance of some of the vital facts; for these rules seem to
104 See Spokane & I. E. R. R. v. Spokane County, supra note 80.
105 See People v. Illinois Central R. R., 273 111. 220, 112 N. E. 700 (1916).
106 See Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, 240 Fed. 485 (D. Nev.
1917), ajf'd, Franklin v. Nevada-California Power Co., 264 Fed. 643 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1920).
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grow naturally out of the system. It is, in truth, doubtful in
many cases whether even assessors themselves could adduce
those vital facts, since they "express an intuition of experience
which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled
impressions." This is "blind justice" in a new guise. In the
long run it must be quite as damaging to the state as to private
corporations. The state may, in the end, by a balancing of the
results of guesses, get all the revenue it might otherwise have
got; but this is no adequate compensation for the long series of
mistakes, the expense, the delays, the disgruntlement incident to
accomplishment of that result. It does make a vast difference
how the result is accomplished. All parties stand to gain by a
system that functions in the daylight.
V
The sort of system that is wanted need not be fashioned anew;
a ready tax instrument seems to be at hand. The states in whose
interest it is to be wielded have, moreover, the benefit of the
example of its use in other states and the wisdom to be gleaned
from their experience with it. 107 The use of gross earnings to
measure corporate tax contributions is not a new tax invention;
it bears the prestige of long and persistent recommendation by
reputable fiscal engineers08 What are the virtues that commend
it as a method better fitted for a place in our tax institutions
107 That property be a tax subject and that it be assessed according to
value are constitutional compulsions in many states. Thus the use of groso
earnings may require constitutional change, which may take different
forms. Both of the above mentioned compulsions might be abolished, or
property might be retained as a formal tax subject, the amount of the
tax on which is to be measured by gross earnings. The latter has been
the practice in Minnesota and California (see MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 32a,
art. 9, § 1; State v. Wells Fargo & Co. infra note 109, at 454, 179 N. W.
at 222; CAL. CONST., art. 13, § 14; and cases cited infra note 109) and is
usually what is meant by "the gross earnings method." Since for assess-
ment purposes either change operates much the same and with equal bene-
fit, either one is urged as a substitute for present ad valorem methods.
108 Seligman, in a comprehensive discussion of the faults and virtues of
various methods, op. cit. supra note 1, 238-260, concludes, at p. 259, that
while a tax on net earnings would be theoretically the best, "As a matter
of practical wisdom it may be conceded that in not a few of the American
states simplicity and convenience of administration are preferable to more
ideal but more difficult methods. In such states the taxation of grosq
earnings may be recommended as an easy solution of the problem for the
time being." See also Holcomb, NAT. TAX ASS'N. PROCE DINGS (1912) 193
et seq., 205 et, seq.; Holcomb, The Assedsment of Public Service Corpora-
tions, NAT. TAX Ass'r. PROCEEDINGS (1911) 149, 161; Foote, Relation of
Franchise Taxation to Service Rates, NAT. TAX Ass'N. PROCEEDINGS (1907)
655; Shortt, The Taxation of Public Service Corporations, ibid. 622; Plehn,
Taxation of Public Service Corporations, ibid. 635.
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than those presently in use?
In addition to the virtues that courts who have dealt with the
:method have found in it-simplicity, convenience, inexpensive-
7ness, less litigation 09 -should be noted another that is a sort of
synthesis of the rest-controllability. It results from the elimina-
tion of some of the unknowns and variables from the assessment
process. Of the several things that one would assume to be
,causes of change in the amount a public utility is asked to con-
tribute to state revenues, the most obvious and important is the
tax rate. If our existing tax institutions were less unruly in
their workings, we could expect the amount to be a matter firmly
,controlled by our legislatures, for it would respond mainly to a
-change in the tax rate. We should, of course, expect change to
result from changes in properties, and from variations in the
-pace of business activity; but we should look for simpler and
more predictable change: more property, more taxes, roughly in
-proportion to the increase in propert; less property, less taxes;
prosperity, higher valuation, more taxes; depression, lower valu-
ation, less taxes. Unfortunately, our mechanisms do not func-
tion so neatly. The whole assessment process becomes another
variable. Even if the above factors remained constant (as in
some instances for limited periods they have) the result would
probably vary unless assessors were content to adopt previous
assessments as their own. What does it avail a legislature that
it controls the rate if its wishes are set at naught by the vagaries
of the assessment process? The task of fashioning a tax policy
and the machinery to carry it into effect is the legislature's. The
answer to the question "How much?" (which is really the com-
pany's chief interest, since to them it is only of secondary in-
terest how the sum was arrived at) is supposed to lie with the
legislature. Here is the crux of the whole matter. What is
wanted is machinery that will obey the will of its supposed
masters and reach a desired goal as they direct. The present
system is more like a rudderless ship. The gross earnings
method makes the rate more truly an instrument of control. It
offers freedom from conditions in which the causes of changing
tax bases must remain buried in the inmost crypts of assessors'
psyche, and in which the judiciary and their servants must
perform prodigies of numerical jugglery to show that the asses-
sors were either right or wrong.
A proposed substitute is not to be condemned because it brings
no promise of freedom from all the problems and defects of its
predecessor. Ups and downs in business would perhaps be re-
flected in assessments by the gross earnings method more closely
109 See State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N. W. 221 (1920) ;
State v. Great Northern Ry., 174 Minn. 3, 10, 218 N. W. 167, 169; cf.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 420, 143 Pac. 700 (1914).
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and directly than before. The effects of this undoubted tendency
could be mitigated by using an average of gross earnings over
a period of, say, five years. The resulting sum would then reflect
a trend in earnings rather than immediate slumps or spurts. Al-
though the tax base would change from year to year, the fluctu-
ation would follow some intelligible and observable cause; and
certainly many would feel that there is a large measure of
justice in a base that followed the trend of earnings. Nor is the
chronicle of the gross earnings method barren of law suits. Prob-
lems of jurisdiction, apportionment, interference with interstate
commerce, and others remain. But it is enough that it greatly
simplifies the process of arriving at a tax base and that its
peculiar problems are comparatively fewer and simpler.
Ultimately, something more is to be hoped for than a piecemeal
patching of our tax institutions. Our property taxes have been
found wanting. If a change in tax institutions is to be effected
it must be preceded by a change in prevailing ways of thinking
about taxes. A few minds have begun to blaze the way. One
judge unwittingly helped when with some *apprehension he re-
marked that "It may become of vital importance at some time
to inquire whether a tax levied upon a capitalization of a profit
is not a tax upon a profit." 110 What does it mean to say that a
tax is "on" a given subject? What does it mean to tax property?
Mr. Justice Holmes has given us his answer. "Taxes generally
are imposed upon persons, for the general advantages of living
within the jurisdiction, not upon property, although measured
more or less by reference to the riches of the person taxed.. ." W
"Since the commercial value of property consists in the expecta-
tion of income from it, and since taxes ultimately, at least in
the long run, come out of income, obviously taxes called taxes
on property, and those called taxes on income or receipts, tend
to run into each other . .. 112 The truth of the last statement
is strongly attested by the workings of the present system, and
more particularly by the predominance of the capitalization of
earnings method. Another authority pointedly says, " If .
the ad valorem method necessarily means in practice the in-
direct use of the earnings method, the question arises: why not
use directly what you are compelled to use indirectly. We may
go further and affirm that nothing is gained, but much is lost,
by electing the indirect, rather than the direct, earnings
110 Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481, 488 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); of.
Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N. E. 570 (1915).
"'JDissent in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 97,
50 Sup. Ct. 59, 62. (1929).
112 Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. R. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
226, 28 Sup. Ct. 638, 639 (1908).
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method." 113 This is, of course, merely substituting a better
measuring tool for a worse. But with it may come a realiza-
tion that most taxes, at least property taxes, are ultimately "on"
income.
na Seligman, op. cit. arpra note 1, at 257.
